UNDCPs 1998 plan to eradicate the cultivation of both coca and opium poppy by the year 2008 was a rare opportunity to re-think current drugs efforts. Member states were asked to endorse a plan, known as SCOPE, for the eradication of drugs-linked crops by 2008, and have it presented at the United Nations General Assembly Special Session (UNGASS) in June 1998 in New York. Is SCOPE viable? And what impact would it have on poor farmers who grow drugs-linked crops to survive?

The 'Global Plan for the Elimination of Illicit Narcotic Crops'

The 'Global Plan' (An International Strategy to Eliminate the Illicit Cultivation of Coca Bush and Opium Poppy – SCOPE), aims at the worldwide elimination of illicit coca bush and opium poppy within 10 years (in 2008 that is), as a first and decisive step to rid the world of its drug problem. With the announcement of a final date the UNDCP seeks a political and financial commitment of the international community. In an interview with the Italian daily La Repubblica, the executive director of the UNDCP, the Italian Pino Arlacchi, said the plan would cost US$ five billion, and has to be financed by the UN member states. Alledgedly the plan has met considerable scepticism. It is considered very "ambitious", but its attainability is widely questioned.

Interesting to note is that the initial outline of the plan (see: document E/CN.7/1997/PC/CRP.11) does not mention a fixed 10-year period. The only document mentioning a 10-year period is the draft proposal of the United States on 'Eradication of Illicit Narcotic Crops and Promotion of Alternative Development Prorammes' for the declaration at UNGASS (see: document E/CN.7/1997/PC/CRP.9). Point 3 of the US proposal says: "States should commit to ending all illicit cultivation of opium poppy and coca bush by the year 2008, using all available means, including alternative development, eradication and law enforcement".

Attempts for approval at the 1998 UNGASS

The UNDCP had hoped for approval of the strategy at the preparatory commission (PrepCom) meetings before UNGASS, but didn't altogether succeed. Arlacchi asked the member states to recommend that the General Assembly at its special session endorse the initiative of the UNDCP to develop and implement SCOPE. His strategy was to have a reference to the plan in either the Action Plan on International Cooperation on the Eradication of Illicit Drug Crops and Alternative Development, or the Political Declaration. A summary was presented to the member states during the PrepCom in December 1997.

Initially, this went terribly wrong. Delegations felt overwhelmed by the plan they had received at a late stage, and word in the lobby was that Arlacchi was firmly opposed in some quarters. SCOPE was removed from the proposed draft Action Plan. During a plenary session on the draft Political Declaration -which also mentioned the 2008 elimination target date- the Dutch delegation diplomatically called for 'feasible goals' both 'in substance and target dates' and added that 'quantative benchmarks should not be an end in itself', which in diplomatic terms could be conceived as a strong critique on the plan.

It became clear that SCOPE would not be discussed by the PrepCom in Vienna. Most European and Latin American countries thought SCOPE was not sufficiently worked out, especially on the subjects of how to finance the proposal, monitoring and the collaboration with other UN organisations. Endorsement there end then would mean issuing a blanc cheque, they felt.

But the UNDCP lobbied successfully in the decisive hours of PrepCom trying to keep the plan on the agenda of the Special Session in New York. Arlacchi called for a press conference on the last day of the meeting. He declared that the outcome of the deliberations during the week on the several draft action plans was a basic endorsement of the proposals of SCOPE, though the details were not discussed. In the end, the final draft of the Political Declaration -only approved on an additional Saturday due to serious disagreements on the final text- calls to "strongly support" the work of the UNDCP in the field of alternative development, and to "emphasize the need for eradication programmes and law enforcement measures to counter illicit cultivation". Moreover, the declaration "welcomes" the UNDCP's global approach to the elimination of illicit crops and "commits" member states to work closely with the UNDCP "to develop strategies with a view to eliminate or significantly reduce the illicit cultivation of the coca bush, the cannabis plant and the opium poppy by 2008." 

The cannabis plant was included at the request of Nigeria – where there is no coca nor opium cultivation. Nigeria considers cannabis to be an "extremely dangerous drug", and felt left out as far as funds for alternative development were concerned, noted Western observers. At the suggestion of the Latin American group of member states (GRULAC) "eradication of opium poppy and coca bush" was changed to "eliminate or significantly reduce". But in the end, without actually mentioning SCOPE itself, the general idea of the strategy is practically endorsed. An earlier version of the draft Political Declaration did not even include such strong commendation of the UNDCP "global approach". Arlacchi may not have gotten SCOPE itself into any declaration, but he got his go-ahead.

A closer look at SCOPE

SCOPE's main objective is worldwide elimination of the illicit cultivation of coca bush and opium poppy by the year 2008. The strategy calls for a 'balanced approach' between law enforcement, alternative development and demand reduction, to rid the world of 'the scourge of heroin and cocaine'. Alternative development is intended to receive the bulk of the approximately US$ 4 billion budget: 74%. Law enforcement is allotted 20% and demand reduction 2%. The UNDCP itself doesn't have innate funds, so it has appealed to the international community to commit itself to SCOPE and to provide the necessary funding. (6)

The plan focuses on eight key countries in three regions: Bolivia, Colombia and Peru in Latin America; the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Myanmar (or Burma as the suppressed democratic opposition prefers to call their nation) and Vietnam in South-East Asia; and Afghanistan and Pakistan in South-West Asia. The supply of illicit opiates and coca derivatives today originates in these "limited number of well-defined geographical areas", according to the UNDCP in summing up the favorable factors in eliminating opiates and coca derivatives in their analysis of the situation.

Secondly, says the agency, "after three decades of experience, the international community is now equipped with tested methodologies and the know-how to tackle the problem in the producing areas. The strengthening of the drug control mechanisms in the regions concerned has paved the way for full-scale interventions and most producing countries have adopted well-defined national strategies and action plans that are ready for implementation."

"At the same time," continues the plan's summary, "it is possible to monitor the areas at risk in order to prevent the 'balloon effect' from nullifying the overall impact of elimination programmes." The 'balloon effect' is the movement of cultivation to previously untouched area as a result of increased enforcement in an area of cultivation (when you squeeze one part of a balloon, the air simply moves to another part without reducing the total amount of air).

The last favorable factor is that "there is no alternative to concerted and comprehensive action". The expression of a "clear political will and the adoption of a common agenda on the part of the international community" is therefore required. The Special Session of the General Assembly on Drug Control "offers an historic opportunity for all positive forces to converge", according to the UNDCP.

A closer look at the confidential 170-page draft of SCOPE reveals the flaws in the strategy, which are less obvious in the summary presented to the PrepCom session. The plan mentions three ideal conditions for alternative development: (1) Effective control of the area by central government and an absence of counterpressure from insurgent groups; (2) The provision of an enabling economic environment at the national and international level which facilitates the presence of market forces that make illicit cultivation less attractive; (3) Consistently applied disincentives through law enforcement and eradication.

A large part of the strategy is centred around elimination and countering the 'balloon effect' in an almost military fashion: development of satellite reconnaissance, rapid assessment teams (RATs) to monitor displacement of drug crops, and the research and development of biological and chemical weapons for "environmentally safe" eradication. The more general, if tacit thinking behind SCOPE is that since drug crop cultivation has been reduced to a well-defined 'pocket' of production areas in the eight above mentioned countries, the containment of this pocket and a last massive final offensive can eliminate the problem once and for all.

Disqueting elements

The 'Global Plan' has some disquieting elements. For instance, it proposes to blend alternative development (crop substitution) with law enforcement measures to eliminate illicit narcotic crop cultivation "to provide a credible deterrent". A combination which has not worked in the past and caused considerable resistance with small-scale producers. These peasants largely depend on the cultivation of drug crops to merely survive. Exactly because it proved to be counter-productive several governments tend to separate law enforcement requirements from alternative development. The UNDCP says to have build the plan on "the experience gained and the lessons learned", but seems to be very slow of understanding.

"Safe" Methods of Eradication

Allarming is the advocacy of chemical fumigation with herbicides and biological control with microbial herbicides as a method to erradicate narcotic crops, proposed by the Commission on Narcotic Drugs (see: document E/CN.7/1997/PC/CRP.8: 'International Cooperation on Eradication of Illicit Drug Crops and Promotion of Alternative Development Programmes and Projects', section: 'Finding Safe Methods of Eradication'). The aerial spraying of herbicides has become a widespread counter-narcotics effort during the last years (even though "safe" herbicides apparently are not yet available). Advocated by the United States, Latin-American governments (Colombia, Mexico, Panama, Guatemala, and Venezuela) increasingly tend to consider chemical fumigation as an effective measure to fight the spread of illicit crops, despite the obvious negative social, environmental and health consequences.

It is highly questionable that there ever will be "safe" herbicides, and there is grave concern about the long-term effects of the massive spreading of these chemicals in the vulnerable ecosystem of the Colombian Amazon tropical rainforest, where coca cultivation is concentrated. The Guaviare and other coca growing regions of Colombia were the scene of widespread social protest in July, August and September of 1996, when an estimated 241,000 people participated in massive marches - one of the largest peasant mobilizations in Colombian history - to protest aerial eradication, lack of government support for economic development and the increasing presence of the Colombian military. In the violence that ensued, 12 individuals were victims of extrajudicial executions and seven disappeared. A number of protest leaders subsequently received death threats and seven were killed, apparently for their involvement in the protest (see: Coca Eradication Efforts in Colombia, WOLA, June 1997).

The Colombian government sprayed 48.000 hectares of coca and poppy crop in 1997. Nevertheless the the total area with drug-crop cultivation expanded with 10 percent, according to satellite monitoring. The fields were simply moved to other areas. One can imagine what will happen next: these fields will be sprayed the next year; cultivation (which in itself is not particulary friendly to the ecosystem) will again move to other regions. A "vicious" circle, contaminating ever-increasing areas.

SCOPE exit?

The controversial strategy was carefully avoided during the UN General Assembly Special Session (UNGASS 1998). It was clear beforehand that the reluctance of potential SCOPE-donor countries during the last PrepCom had already prevented that SCOPE as such was part of the official UNGASS agenda, but it was even further off than expected. From UNDCP side the very word 'SCOPE' wasn't even mentioned. The UNDCP consciously decided to avoid further contamination of UNGASS by the controverses that arose in reaction to the SCOPE-plan.

Of course, in many ways, references were made to the 'need for a global strategy' and the 'viability of achieving a significant reduction of illicit crop production by 2008'. Similar wordings remained in the adopted Political Declaration, which expresses support for UNDCP to architect and direct such a strategy, giving executive director Pino Arlacchi the much wanted mandate to continue along the SCOPE-path.

But it was quite apparent UNDCP had felt the necessity to ajust their tactics and soften their language. Just three months ago Arlacchi, defending SCOPE, could be quoted saying "The 'war on drugs' has not been fought and lost; it has never started." Now in New York he stated, very carefully, "There has never been a war on drugs – and there should not be one now. I think we all agree – the drug problem is more like a disease. And together we have to cure the patient, hit at the traffickers and criminal groups, and provide an alternate way of life to those engaged in illicit cultivation."

The paper Caught in the Crossfire - Developing Countries, the UNDCP and the War on Drugs, jointly published by The Transnational Institute and the Catholic Institute of International Relations (CIIR), clearly made an impact. It was the only available serious critique on one of the most controversial issues in the background of this UNGASS. Next to the reluctance of several delegations, it's fair to say that our campaign around it did at least contribute to the softening of language from UNDCP side and their very careful handling of the SCOPE-issue at press conferences.

Related documents:

• An International Strategy to Eliminate the Illicit Cultivation of Coca Bush and Opium Poppy, E/CN.7/1998/PC/CRP.4, document presented at the CND, Vienna, March 16-20, 1998
• A Global Plan for the Elimination of Illicit Narcotic Crops, E/CN.7/1997/PC/CRP.11, December 1, 1997
• Draft Proposal by the European Union, E/CN.7/1997/PC/CRP.10, December 1, 1997
• Draft Proposal by the United States, E/CN.7/1997/PC/CRP.9, November 27, 1997
• Proposal by Colombia, E/CN.7/1997/PC/CRP.7/Rev.1, November 27, 1997
• Note by the Secretariat of the CND, E/CN.7/1997/PC/CRP.8, October 23, 1997

For a critical assessment of SCOPE read:

• Lessons to Learn by Ken Bluestone & Tom Blickman, The World Today, Vol. 54, No. 6, June 1998
• Caught in the Crossfire. Developing Countries, the UNDCP, and the War on Drugs by Tom Blickman. A joint briefing of TNI and the Catholic Institute for International Relations (CIIR), June 1998